Political Discussion on Facebook: An Analysis of Interpersonal Goals and Disagreement by Kearney, Michael Wayne
  
 
 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON FACEBOOK:  
AN ANALYSIS OF INTERPERSONAL GOALS AND DISAGREEMENT  
By 
Michael W. Kearney 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Communication Studies  
and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Chairperson Dr. Mary Banwart 
 
 
______________________________ 
Dr. Jeffrey Hall 
 
 
______________________________ 
Dr. Scott Harris 
 
 
 
 
Date defended: December 18, 2013
   ii
 
 
The Thesis Committee for Michael W. Kearney 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:  
 
 
POLITICAL DISCUSSION ON FACEBOOK:  
AN ANALYSIS OF INTERPERSONAL GOALS AND DISAGREEMENT  
  
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Chairperson Dr. Mary Banwart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date approved: December 19, 2013
   iii
Abstract 
This study investigates the processes that motivate, constrain, and shape political 
conversations on Facebook. Through an analysis of the Goals-Plans-Action model and the 
Political Interpersonal Communication index, this study finds that Facebook political 
conversations are primarily motivated by cognitive engagement and primarily constrained by 
personal standards regarding the appropriateness of di cussing politics on Facebook. These 
conversations are further shaped by desires to create positive impressions. This study also 
examines the effects of disagreement on Facebook political conversations. Findings indicate that 
perceived disagreement does influence political activity on Facebook, though this relationship 
varies according to individual levels of tolerance for disagreement, political information efficacy, 
and political extremism. Overall, this study contributes to political disagreement scholarship and 
demonstrates the unique contributions of both interpersonal and political communication theory 
in the area of interpersonal political communication. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Technology continues to blur the lines between mass media and interpersonal channels of 
communication, allowing individuals to effortlessly chat with one another about political issues 
without geographical constraints. In today’s increasingly digitalized age, individuals consume 
information from emerging online sources, while political campaigns scour databases to pinpoint 
consumer patterns in order to design messages that target smaller and smaller audiences 
(Issenberg, 2012). As a consequence, evidence of online social media’s influence on politics 
continues to accumulate. A recent Pew survey found that two-thirds of young Americans 
engaged in social network-related political activities in the previous year (Smith, 2013). Roughly 
60% of American adults now use online social networking sites, and nearly 40% of adults have 
used social media sites for political activities like posting comments or sharing links about 
politics (Rainie, Smith, Schlozman, Brady, & Verba, 2012). Much of this activity occurred on 
Facebook, the most popular social media site in the United States with 167 million active users 
(Fottrell, 2013). It comes as little surprise, then, that interpersonal channels of communication on 
Facebook have influenced America’s political landscape (Bond et al., 2012). 
Taken together, these findings call into question many of the mass media assumptions 
found in political communication scholarship. Scholars have begun unearthing the effects of 
online interpersonal political communication, though precise understandings of the interplay 
between interpersonal and political communication scholarship remains illusive (Chaffee, 2001). 
With this in mind, the present study will analyze a cross-sectional survey in order to contribute to 
political communication scholarship in two ways. First, this study seeks to examine the role of 
interpersonal influences in online political discussion. Through Dillard’s (1990) Goals-Plans-
Action model, this study will analyze the motivations and constraints within online political 
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discussion and draw comparisons between interpersonal influence goals and dimensions of a 
political communication construct designed to reflect the interpersonal processes involved in 
political conversations. Second, this study seeks to ex end political discussion research by 
examining the ways in which online discussion networks influence online behaviors. In 
particular, this study will examine how exposure to conflicting viewpoints influences Facebook 
political conversations. This study ultimately aims to contribute to political communication 
scholarship by providing a more accurate understanding of the interpersonal processes that occur 
in online channels of communication. 
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature 
Political Discussion 
Political discussion broadly refers to communication between individuals about public 
affairs. The precise meaning of the term, however, tends to fluctuate. Scheufele (1999) argued 
that political discussion includes both political conversation, which involves informal social 
interactions, and political talk, which is the more formal exchange of arguments. For the purpose 
of this study, political discussion will be defined as political conversation, or the interpersonal 
interactions about topics related to politics that occurs in more informal settings (Eveland, 
Morey, & Hutchens, 2011). Although this definition f political discussion does not necessarily 
resolve the ambiguity surrounding the term, research has nevertheless revealed several 
characteristics of political discussion. This research typically focuses on three areas: (1) the 
effects of political discussion on democratic outcomes, (2) the likelihood of political discussion, 
especially in specific contexts, and (3) the degree to which political discussion includes 
disagreement (Eveland, Morey, & Hutchens, 2011).  
Democratic Outcomes  
The first area of focus for political discussion research examines democratic outcomes. 
Studies have found that political discussion positively relates with political knowledge (Eveland 
& Hutchens, 2009; Eveland & Thomson, 2006; Holbert, Benoit, Hansen, & Wen, 2002; Jung, 
Kim, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2011; Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zuniga, 2011) and political 
participation (Jung et al., 2011; Mutz, 2002b; Tian, 2011; Zhang, Johnson, & Bichard, 2010). 
When examined as an intermediary influence of democratic outcomes, several studies have 
found that political media use and political interest predict political discussion (Moy & Gastil, 
2006; Scheufele, 2002; Tian, 2011). However, studies in this area tend to operationalize political 
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discussion with one-dimensional measurements of frequency (e.g., Eveland & Hutchens, 2009; 
Holbert et al., 2002; Tian, 2011). Thus, while this re earch continues to reveal the relationships 
between political discussion and normatively desirable democratic outcomes, it rarely describes 
the ways in which political discussion actually occurs. 
Likelihood of Online Political Discussion 
The second area of focus in political discussion research examines the likelihood of 
political discussion. This research contributes to understandings of where and how political 
discussion actually occurs by exploring specific contexts. While research in this area has 
generally assumed face-to-face contexts, scholars have recently explored political discussion in 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) contexts (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005). Computer-
mediated communication differs from previous research in this area because CMC restricts 
important face-to-face communicative behaviors (Walther, Van Der Heide, Tong, Carr, & Atkin, 
2010). For example, CMC limits nonverbal cues, causing individuals to manage interpersonal 
relational goals with more language-based strategies (Walther, 2007; Walther et al., 2010). This 
emphasis on language thus demonstrates the potential for unique political communicative 
patterns in CMC contexts. 
An extension of the research exploring online, or CMC, political discussion examines 
whether it produces similar outcomes when compared to offline, or face-to-face, discussion. 
Studies have found significant relationships between both online and offline political 
communication and offline political participation (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Moy, Manosevitch, 
Stamm, & Dunsmore, 2005). These findings suggest that online political discussion can produce 
similar outcomes to offline discussion, but again, it does not describe the ways in which political 
discussion actually occurs in CMC. 
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More recently, scholars have sought to compare political discussion in political and 
nonpolitical CMC contexts. In this line of inquiry political contexts refer to politically oriented 
platforms such as political blogs and discussion forums, whereas nonpolitical contexts refer to 
socially oriented media platforms. Political contexts tend to have greater levels of political 
discussion frequency, while nonpolitical contexts tend to produce more ideologically diverse 
environments, especially for young voters (Kahne, Middaugh, Lee, & Freezell, 2011; Kim, 
2011). This may seem obvious given that politically oriented sites naturally attract more political 
interested people. However, the emergence of more organic forms of political discussion 
between diverse individuals in nonpolitically orient d sites should not be overlooked. 
Nonpolitical online contexts typically include social networking sites (SNSs), which are 
online platforms that enable individuals to connect and communicate with online and offline 
acquaintances. With the growth of CMC, individuals spend more and more time discussing 
politics on SNSs (Kim, 2011). And, on the surface, SNSs appear to be convenient vehicles for 
everyday discussion between individuals regardless of geographical distance. However, for 
political discussion, not all SNSs are created equal. On the one hand, when several SNSs such as 
MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube were combined to repres nt online political discussion, 
Zhang et al. (2010) found that only face-to-face political discussion positively related with 
political participation. On the other hand, research focused more narrowly on Facebook has 
found that online political discussion produced a meaningful influence on political activities such 
as voting (Bond et al., 2012). These findings therefore suggest that political discussion operates 
differently depending on the SNS. 
Thus, the present study seeks to contribute to political discussion research by examining a 
particular SNS, Facebook. Originally created for college students, Facebook has expanded to 
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become America’s most popular SNS (Fottrell, 2013), connecting millions of users with family 
members, friends, and acquaintances. As an interactive SNS, Facebook offers many 
interpersonal features that facilitate the sharing of information including updating profiles, 
posting and responding to comments, chatting, and liking posts. The growing popularity of 
Facebook has drawn attention from CMC scholars who have examined concepts such as 
impression management (Rosenberg & Edberg, 2011; Walther, Van Der Heide, Kim, 
Westerman, & Tong, 2008), social capital (Valenzuela, Park, & Kee, 2009), and CMC 
apprehension (Hunt, Atkin, & Krishnan, 2012), though this research has only recently begun to 
scratch the surface of interpersonal communication concepts such as influence goals (Dillard, 
2004). Further research is therefore needed to moreth oughly examine the implications of 
political discussion on Facebook. 
Indeed, previous studies support this decision to focus on Facebook in communication 
research and specifically political communication research. Compared to other SNSs, Facebook 
appears to more accurately reflect two important elem nts of face-to-face communication. First, 
Facebook promotes higher levels of identity salience than other SNSs. Halpern and Gibbs (2013) 
argued that as levels of anonymity in online settings increase, individual behavior becomes more 
socially deregulated in ways that diverge from face-to-face communication patterns. Since 
Facebook connects many users together with easily accessible profile information, it creates 
higher levels of identity salience than other online media such as YouTube and anonymous 
message boards (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013). As a result, poli ical discussion on Facebook tends to 
be more active and sociable (Halpern & Gibbs, 2013). Second, Facebook connects more offline 
friendships that tend to facilitate political mobilization (Bond et al., 2012), especially when 
compared to YouTube and SNSs that maintain higher levels of anonymity (Halpern & Gibbs, 
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2013). Thus, while computer-mediated political communication might ultimately differ in some 
ways from face-to-face communication (McLeod & Shah, 2009), the potential for online political 
discussion to influence offline behaviors may still exist on Facebook. 
Granted, scholars have recently examined political discussion on Facebook, though they 
have mostly focused on the effects of political discussion on Facebook (e.g., Warner, McGowen, 
& Hawthorne, 2012; Vitak et al., 2011; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). Many of these 
studies have measured political discussion, or Facebook political participation, as a one-
dimensional index of activities on Facebook such as posting comments and sharing news stories 
(e.g., Warner et al., 2012; Vissers & Stolle, 2012; Vitak et al., 2011). In order to draw 
comparisons with these studies, this study will employ a similar index of political activity to 
capture Facebook political participation. However, unlike previous research that examined the 
outcomes of Facebook political participation, this study will analyze Facebook political 
participation as an outcome of interpersonal processes. 
Political Disagreement 
The third area of focus for political discussion research examines the degree to which 
individuals experience disagreement. Deliberative democratic theory has influenced much of this 
research (Mutz, 2008), as theorists have described the ideal forms of political discussion 
according to the deliberative model of democracy. Gutmann and Thompson (2003), for example, 
defined deliberation as the process of discussion and critical thinking between and among 
citizens regarding public decisions. Definitions such as these have inspired empirical research as 
notable theorists such as Habermas (2006) have encouraged the empirical examination of 
deliberative principles. Accordingly, the ideal, abstract concept of deliberation has become a 
referent point for political discussion research today. 
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The problem for many social scientists, however, has been that their attempts to 
examine normative theories of deliberation have not captured the ideal conditions on which they 
depend (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002; Mutz, 2008). For instance, deliberative theory may 
dictate that political discussion ought to exist in formal and public settings between diverse 
participants who engage in political disagreement in order to pursue rationale decisions. Of 
course, such a set of characteristics, however desiable, rarely reflects everyday occurrences of 
political discussion (Conover et al., 2002). Mutz (2008) therefore argued that empirical research 
should instead examine middle-range theories by replacing the vague concepts with more 
concrete descriptions of actually existing relationships in order to produce piecemeal 
contributions to grander deliberative frameworks. 
Recent research has attempted to navigate this middle ground by examining disagreement 
in political conversations. Political disagreement broadly refers to the exposure to conflicting 
viewpoints during political conversations (Klofstad, Sokhey, & McClurg, 2013). This research 
tends to examine the likelihood and effects of political disagreement. However, the diversity in 
normative democratic theory literature has resulted in a proliferation of definitions regarding 
political disagreement. For these reasons, this study will evaluate competing definitions of 
political disagreement as they relate to the context of Facebook political discussion.  
Goals-Plans-Action 
In order to more fully explore the connection between online political discussion and 
interpersonal processes, the present study will anayze online political discussion through a 
Goals-Plans-Action (GPA) model. In order to apply elements of the model, however, it is first 
necessary to unearth a key GPA assumption that lies within interpersonal influence attempts. The 
assumption being that communication is inherently purposive. Individuals select, structure, and 
   9
direct symbols so that every utterance serves a purpose whether it is to just pass time or to 
express a particular emotion (Kellermann, 1992). In the context of interpersonal communication, 
conversation goals not only motivate individuals, they shape and direct the act of communication 
itself (Kellermann, 1992). Thus, to study interpersonal influence is to study the ability for 
individuals to achieve and maintain goals within interactions. 
With this in mind, Dillard (1990) developed the Goals-Plans-Action (GPA) model to help 
explain the purposive communicative processes within nterpersonal influence attempts. 
According to the GPA model, interpersonal interactions fit into a three-step sequence. First, 
individuals desire instrumental goals. Dillard (1990) defined goals as “future states of affairs 
which an individual is committed to achieving or maint ining” (p. 43). Second, individuals 
develop plans to achieve and maintain goals. Plans are cognitive representations of procedures 
directed toward a goal (Berger, 1997). Third, indivi uals act to achieve and maintain a goal. 
Action refers to the enactment of behaviors designed to realize a goal (Dillard, 2008). In short, 
according to GPA, interpersonal influence occurs though a desire, a method, and a process. 
That communication is purposive, however, does not suggest that individuals maintain a 
conscious awareness of goals. Communication tends to occur automatically, meaning strategies 
are learned and tacitly used (Kellermann, 1992). The GPA model therefore assumes that 
individuals make choices with varying degrees of awareness when attempting to influence others 
(Dillard, 2008). This does not mean that individuals maintain awareness during conversations, 
but that goals are consciously accessible. That is, individuals can recall goals even without 
awareness during interactions (Dillard, 2004). In this way, the GPA model reflects the processes 
that occur with varying degrees of conscious awareness (Dillard, 2004). And, since GPA 
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retroactively accounts for these decisions, it serves as a valuable heuristic for interpersonal 
influence interactions. 
Primary Goals 
The GPA model includes primary and secondary goals. Primary goals describe an 
individual’s desire to induce change in another person (Dillard, Segrin, & Harden, 1989). 
Primary goals frame interactions and, consequently, motivate plans and actions (Dillard et al., 
1989; Schrader & Dillard, 1998). The GPA model considers these goals “primary” because they 
define situations of interpersonal influence (Dillard et al., 1989). Primary goals provide the initial 
push that triggers a series of considerations that include secondary goals (Dillard, 2004; Dillard 
et al., 1989). In the context this study, primary goals are the influence goals that draw individuals 
toward political conversations on Facebook. 
Secondary Goals 
Secondary goals describe general motivations that shape and constrain individuals 
(Dillard et al., 1989). While primary goals motivate, secondary goals typically constrain 
interactions. That does not suggest, however, that primary goals are more important. Rather, 
influence goals primarily motivate and frame interactions, whereas secondary goals describe and 
constrain interactions (Wilson, 2007). Within interp sonal influence interactions, individuals 
attempt to balance and achieve multiple goals simultaneously (Dillard, 2004). In this sense, 
secondary goals shape and constrain behaviors that would otherwise mirror the instrumental 
purpose of interactions (Dillard et al., 1989). For example, imagine an individual, Susan, who is 
confronted with a friend, John, expressing a conflicting viewpoint on the definition of marriage. 
The GPA model would predict Susan to have, with varying degrees, an influence goal of 
persuading John to change his view. However, if Susan also strongly believes that pursuing her 
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influence goal might ruin her friendship, then her s condary goal—preserving her relationship 
with John—might overwhelm her influence goal and, consequently, constrain her action. In this 
example, the influence goal describes the situation, while the secondary goal ultimately 
constrains the interpersonal influence behavior. 
Secondary goals that shape and constrain interactions include identity goals, interaction 
goals, relational resource goals, personal resource goals, and affect management (originally 
labeled “arousal management”) goals as initially developed by Dillard et al. (1989). Identity 
goals describe the desires relating to an individual’s self-concept, which operate according to 
internal standards or a personal conduct derived from an individual’s beliefs and preferences 
(Dillard et al., 1989). Personal resource goals describe the desire to maintain tangible and 
intangible assets (Dillard et al., 1989). Affect management goals a sume that individuals want to 
maintain a preferred state of arousal (Dillard et al., 1989). Affect management goals therefore 
describe the desire to feel comfortable in an interpersonal influence attempt (Dillard et al., 1989). 
Interaction goals relate to social appropriateness and describe the desire to produce relevant and 
coherent messages while also managing impressions (Dillard et al., 1989) Relational resource 
goals are the personal rewards, emotional support, and other gratifications that result from the 
interactions (Clark & Delia, 1979). These goals thus attempt to measure the movations that relate 
to the interaction itself. 
In addition to these secondary goals, the influence goal also functions as a secondary goal 
during interpersonal interactions. The initial push from the influence goal frames the interaction, 
but it does not, in and of itself, explain influenc behaviors. However, when the influence goal 
overwhelms constraints, it provides substance to the interaction. Since the meaning of an 
interaction is provided by secondary goals, the influence goal may temporarily function like a 
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secondary goal (Dillard et al., 1989). In other words, the influence goal triggers the interaction 
and functions as a motivator for influence behaviors. This study will therefore measure the 
influence goal alongside secondary goals in the context of political discussion on Facebook. 
Interpersonal Goals and Political Discussion 
To better understand the motivations and constraints of online political discussion, this 
study applies the GPA model to political interactions on Facebook. Examining the motivators 
and constraints of online political discussion is necessary because, in addition to general 
communication differences, CMC produces messages that are immediately accessible to larger 
audiences that in turn influence interpersonal communication processes (McLeod & Shah, 2009). 
Moreover, the accessibility, speed, and graphical capa ities of CMC introduce unique ways to 
produce messages that open new pathways for communicatio . The use of text formats and 
images, for example, has been found to vary as different interpersonal goals rise in importance 
within interpersonal interactions (Wilson & Zigurs, 2001). Based on these findings, Dillard 
(2004) theorized that some CMC contexts would encourage individuals to place greater value on 
instrumental goals as they focus more on content. However, while scholars have noted that 
particular situations can influence the force of particular goals (Schrader & Dillard, 1998), 
research has rarely explored the GPA model in CMC generally (Dillard, 2004) and the role of 
motivators and constrainers of political discussion specifically (Eveland, Morey, & Hutchens, 
2011). Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to interpersonal influence research in the area of 
online political discussion. 
Since the GPA approach to interpersonal influence assumes that communication occurs 
purposively, however, the primary or influence goal must be defined in the context of the 
Facebook political participation. In this case, the influence goal describes the persuasive goal 
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that takes place during political interactions on Facebook. And, while some individuals in 
face-to-face political conversations may attempt to ul imately change a particular person’s 
political views, this study assumes that individuals have less ambitious goals when posting on 
Facebook. Given the increased size and the level of uncertainty in audiences within political 
interactions on Facebook, individuals would likely desire a more modest persuasive goal. Thus, 
the influence goal will be defined as getting Facebook friends to consider one’s own political 
point of view. According the GPA model, then, the influence goal should predict Facebook 
political participation. 
H1a: Individuals with strong influence goals will be more likely to participate in political 
activity on Facebook. 
 The desire to influence Facebook friends will likely be constrained by the identity, 
relational resource, and personal resource goals  Since the identity goal describes an individual's 
own personal conduct in a situation, the identity goal will be defined as internal standards 
regarding the appropriateness of discussing politics on Facebook. Individuals with strong identity 
goals would therefore believe that their political views do not belong on Facebook. Individuals 
with strong relational and personal resource goals might also be constrained in similar ways 
during political conversations. That is, as individuals become more concerned about losing 
relational resources, they might also start to become increasingly concerned with retaliatory or 
negative reactions. In terms of political conversations, these concerned have some empirical 
support. Mutz (2002b) found that social accountability concerns often compelled individuals to 
align with one group of friends while they simultaneously battled competing desires to not place 
other social relationships at risk. In other words, individuals looking to maintain social 
relationships often find themselves in difficult situations. Either they upset their friends who 
   14
dislike displays of political activity, or they upset their friends who expect them to join in the 
political activities. The relational resource goal will therefore be defined as the desire to maintain 
friendships or the concern over harming friendships through political conversations on Facebook, 
and the personal resource goal will be defined as the perceived potential of interpersonal threats 
in the forms of verbal attacks, ridicule, or backlash. Since individuals balance both interpersonal 
and intrapersonal tensions during political conversations, Facebook political participation should 
decrease as the identity, relational resource, and personal resource goals increase. 
H1b: Individuals with strong identity, relational resource, and personal resource goals 
will be less likely to participate in political activity on Facebook. 
While these relationships appear somewhat obvious, the relationships between the 
interaction and affect management goals and Facebook p litical participation are less clear. 
Since the interaction goal refers to the relational process rather than relationships, it reflects the 
desire to create positive impressions during political discussions on Facebook. While it seems 
possible that individuals would want to create or maintain positive impressions during political 
interactions on Facebook, it also seems possible that individuals would be deterred from entering 
those conversations because they do not feel confident n their own political knowledge. This 
relationship between confidence in one's own political knowledge and online political 
participation also has some empirical support (Warner et al., 2012). Similar to the interaction 
goal, the affect management goal describes to the affective process during interactions. Affect 
management goal therefore reflects a desire to avoid feelings of discomfort or nervousness in 
Facebook political conversations. However, while individuals might typically experience 
discomfort or nervousness in offline political conversations, online interactions may shield 
individuals from these affective concerns. With these considerations in mind, this study will 
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explore the relationships between the interaction and affect management goals and Facebook 
political participation.  
RQ1: Are individuals with strong interaction and affect management goals more or less 
likely to participate in political activities on Facebook? 
Political Interpersonal Communication 
In order to further explore political discussion, which lies at the intersection of political 
and interpersonal communication scholarship, the GPA model will also be compared to a 
political communication construct. Political communication research in this area has typically 
emphasized the behavioral components of political discussion, asking individuals to self-report 
levels of frequency (Banwart, 2007b). While this literature helps explain how the attitudes and 
perceptions of others influence political discussion, it does not necessarily capture how internal 
attitudes and perceptions influence an individual's decision to enter political discussion. Thus, 
Banwart (2007b) developed the Political Interpersonal Communication (PIC) index in order to 
represent the dimensions involved in decisions to engage in political discussion. Banwart 
(2007b) found that cognitive engagement, perceived relevance, and perceived knowledge 
emerged as the primary dimensions of political interpersonal communication. Together, these 
dimensions can explain the likelihood of individuals to enter political discussions even when the 
opinions of others are unclear (Banwart, 2007b). The present study will therefore extend 
Banwart’s (2007b) Political Interpersonal Communication index to predict Facebook political 
participation. 
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H2: Individuals with high cognitive engagement, perceived knowledge, and perceived 
relevance will be more likely to participate in political activity on Facebook. 
The first dimension of the PIC index, cognitive engagement, refers to the cognitive 
processes involved in developing political opinions, i cluding the affective orientations toward 
political discussion (Banwart, 2007b). Individuals with high cognitive engagement also 
demonstrate perceptions of understanding and enjoyment in political discussion (Banwart, 
2007b). These elements reflect previous research that found political discussion related to 
political interest (Tian, 2001). Since individuals with high cognitive engagement tend to 
understand and appreciate political topics, their bhaviors would likely mirror the instrumental 
values found in the influence goal. 
The second dimension, perceived relevance, refers to degree to which an individual feels 
and understands the relationship between political issues and his or her life (Banwart, 2007b). An 
individual with higher levels of perceived relevance believes politics directly and personally 
influences his or her life (Banwart, 2007b). In a sen e, perceived relevance may share common 
ground with the influence goal since both constructs reflect instrumental concerns. Banwart 
(2007b) suggested that one perspective on this dimension “could argue that if someone feels 
politics and political issues are personally relevant and if they understand the resulting influence 
in their life, then it is likely they will adopt the view that politics are instrumental” (2007, p. 23). 
Thus, as perceived relevance increases, so, too, shuld the influence goal. 
H3a: Individuals with high cognitive engagement and individuals with high perceived 
relevance will have stronger influence goals in Facebook political conversations. 
 The third dimension of the PIC index, perceived knowledge, refers to the relationship 
between perceptions of political knowledge competence and political discussions (Banwart, 
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2007b). This dimension reflects the desire for individuals to feel sufficiently knowledgeable 
about politics before engaging in political discussion (Banwart, 2007b). Elements of perceived 
knowledge reflect another political communication cstruct that supported this connection 
between political information competence and political behaviors. Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco 
(2007) found that Political Information Efficacy related to political participation. While this 
finding illustrates the importance of perceived knowledge, Banwart (2007b) argued that the 
perceived knowledge dimension ultimately differs from political information efficacy because it 
emphasizes interpersonal communication rather than political participation more broadly 
(voting). If individuals are concerned about feeling knowledgeable, then those perceptions might 
also reflect the impression management concerns repres nted in the interaction goal. Thus, as 
perceived knowledge increases, individuals should become increasingly concerned with 
managing impressions and interaction goals due to their perceptions of insufficient perceived 
knowledge. 
H3b: Individuals with high perceived knowledge will have stronger interaction goals in 
Facebook political conversations. 
RQ2: Do cognitive engagement, perceived relevance, and perceived knowledge predict 
the identity, personal resource, relationship resource, and affect management goals? 
Political Disagreement 
 Before describing what counts as disagreement on Facebook, it is necessary to first locate 
the point at which disagreement occurs. Research in this area tends to either examine 
disagreement that occurs within an individual’s networks and disagreement that occurs between 
an individual and his or her network (Nir, 2005). The former approach, or network-level 
disagreement, describes the diversity of viewpoints found within a discussion network. However, 
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while network-level disagreement reflects the composition of a network, it does not take into 
consideration the ego’s political viewpoints (Nir, 2005). This is problematic for the current study 
because an individual with a homogeneous discussion network would report very little 
disagreement even if that individual held very different views compared to his or her network. 
Fortunately, the second approach resolves this concern. In this approach, the homogeneity of a 
network would only register as disagreement if those views differed from the individual’s views. 
Political disagreement will therefore be defined at the individual-level in order to analyze 
disagreement as it occurs between the individual and his or her network. 
After locating the point of disagreement, it is also necessary to understand the competing 
descriptions of disagreement that have created some c nfusion in political disagreement 
research. On the one hand, after measuring disagreement by comparing the presidential vote 
choices of an individual with the vote choices in his or her network – what I will refer to as 
affiliative disagreement – Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn (2004) found that individuals 
regularly encounter political disagreement. On the other hand, after measuring disagreement by 
asking participants to report perceptions of conflicting viewpoints – what I will refer to as 
perceived disagreement – Mutz (2002a, 2002b) found that individuals rarely encounter political 
disagreement. While these approaches clearly differ, th y both appear to capture forms of 
political disagreement.  
To understand the implications of these approaches, it is important to further understand 
how these approaches differ. In a panel study that compared the two measurements, Klofstad et 
al. (2013) found that only perceived disagreement had a significant relationship with political 
discussion. Klofstad (2013) argued that while affiliative disagreement provides a broader scope 
that captured more disagreement, perceived disagreement captures the more intense 
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manifestations of disagreement that tended influence political discussion (Klofstad et al., 
2013).  Morey, Eveland, and Hutchens (2012) offered ad itional support for this distinction, 
arguing that perceived disagreements are more likely to influence discussion frequency, whereas 
political differences are more likely to influence ultimate decisions. Since the present study seeks 
to examine both the frequency and the effects of Facebook political discussion, political 
disagreement will be operationalized as perceived disagreement. 
 Previous research in this area has generally confirmed Mutz’s (2002b) argument that 
individuals retreat from political activity as political disagreement increases. Studies found that 
political disagreement decreases political participation (Mutz, 2002b), political interest, and 
political discussion (Klofstad et al., 2013; Wojcieszak & Price, 2012). Research also found that 
political disagreement increases awareness of opposing viewpoint rationales and tolerance 
(Mutz, 2002a). However, many of these studies, like much of political discussion literature, have 
only examined face-to-face communication.  
Online Political Disagreement 
 Though scholars have only recently started to examine political disagreement in online 
contexts, research suggests that, contrary to the assumption that CMC creates political echo 
chambers, individuals actually experience more politica  disagreement in online settings 
(Brundidge, 2010). Nonpolitical contexts, in particular, generate more opportunities for political 
disagreement than politically oriented contexts (Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). However, much like 
in face-to-face communication, online political discu sion occurs less frequently as individuals 
encounter more political disagreement (Valenzuela et al., 2011). While these studies illustrate 
some patterns of online political discussion, very little research has examined the effects of 
political disagreement in specific online contexts. 
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 Facebook is one such online context that has been featured in recent political 
messaging trends. In addition to its nonpolitical orientation, Facebook connects a variety of users 
in ways that may be conducive to political disagreem nts. For example, unlike many SNSs, 
Facebook appears to create more encouraging environments for political discussion because user 
profiles display personal information that tends to discourage inflammatory behaviors that may 
deter political conversations (Kushin & Kitchener, 2009). This is not to suggest, however, that 
Facebook users seek out disagreement. Rather, much like offline political conversations, 
Facebook users still seek out likeminded discussion partners. However, inadvertent exposure to 
conflicting viewpoints occurs more often because individuals do not actively avoid political 
disagreement (Kushin & Kitchener, 2009). Facebook also offers users a number of features that 
could theoretically facilitate political disagreement. The ability to share links and stories with 
social media “plug-ins," for example, enables indivi uals to influence one another by 
communicating personal recommendations between frieds (Mutz & Young, 2011). However, 
while these Facebook features appear intriguing for the purpose of political disagreement 
research, they also present obstacles in terms of measurement. 
Measuring Facebook Political Disagreement 
Though recent research has broadly examined political d sagreement in SNSs, little has 
been done to refine disagreement measurements originally created for face-to-face 
communication. Several studies have compared various online platforms using a single-item to 
measure overall perceptions of cross-cutting views (e.g., Kim, 2011; Valenzuela et al., 2011; 
Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). In another study, Mutz and Martin (2001) measured political 
disagreement by replacing face-to-face discussant names with mass media sources. While this 
approach makes sense because media sources provide fairly consistent, one-directional channels 
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of communication, it does not capture the interactive nature of SNSs. Given the lack of 
empirical refinement in this area of research, I propose an approach to measuring disagreement 
by first navigating the constraints common to several approaches in recent political disagreement 
research. 
One consistent approach in the literature has been to measure political disagreement with 
name generators that ask participants to identify and answer questions about three to five 
discussant partners (Eveland, Hutchens, & Morey, 2013). While these name generators can offer 
more detailed information about political discussion networks, they can also underestimate 
political network size particularly for larger networks that include weaker ties (Eveland et al., 
2013). Since close ties tend to be more like-minded (Mutz & Young, 2001), name generators 
may not capture the influential conversations involving weak-ties (Valenzuela et al., 2011) that 
occur on SNSs like Facebook, on which individuals tend to experience more disagreement 
(Wojcieszak & Mutz, 2009). Furthermore, because messages immediately reach larger 
audiences, individuals tend to alter their messages in online political interactions (McLeod & 
Shah, 2009), highlighting the importance of capturing larger proportions of networks in online 
contexts. Though the name generator approach has proven to be robust in offline contexts, these 
concerns raise doubts regarding its ability to accurately capture political disagreement in 
Facebook interactions. 
With these concerns in mind, this study will represent political disagreement on 
Facebook using a general network measure. Also, to address the concerns expressed by Morey et 
al. (2012) regarding items that reflect both affiliat ve and perceived differences, Mutz’s (2002b) 
cross-cutting exposure scale will be modified in order to better reflect perceived, individual-level 
disagreement on Facebook. These decisions also appear consistent with Klofstad et al.’s (2013) 
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recommendation that scholars select dimensions of disagreement according to their research 
questions. Thus, after accounting for these measurement concerns, this study will hypothesize 
that Facebook political participation will decrease as individuals perceive more disagreement. 
H4:  Individuals with high perceived disagreement will be less likely to participate in 
political activity on Facebook. 
Avoidance of Political Disagreement 
Ultimately, a primary goal of the present study is to contribute to an understanding of 
how and when Facebook political disagreement influeces Facebook political participation. The 
approach taken here differs from much of the previous research insofar as it examines the 
relationships between two different patterns of communication. In other words, rather than 
examining how political disagreement influences political behaviors or attitudes, this study 
examines how political disagreement influences communication. And, in order to analyze the 
effect of political disagreement on Facebook political communication, it is necessary to 
understand the ways in which individuals differ in their responses to disagreement. 
Previous research suggests that these differences may manifest when individuals decide 
to avoid political conversations in their attempts to avoid disagreement. Experimental evidence 
suggests that individuals tend to avoid disagreement in i terpersonal discussions (Gerber, Huber, 
Doherty, & Dowling, 2012; Ulbig & Funk, 1999). This research has also been extended to 
political discussion. Morey et al. (2012) found that individuals anticipate political disagreement 
and then decide to avoid or engage political topics (Morey et al., 2012). The present study will 
therefore hypothesize that Facebook political participation will vary as individuals perceive 
disagreement and decide to avoid political conversations on Facebook. 
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H5: As perceived disagreement increased, individuals wil  increasingly attempt to 
avoid politics and, in turn, participate less often in political activity on Facebook. 
Tolerance for Disagreement 
Individual differences might also emerge within these avoidance decisions. Most 
obviously, some individuals might be more sensitive o disagreement than others. Ulbig and 
Funk (1999) found that conflict-avoidant individuals re more likely to avoid political 
discussions because they tend to anticipate disagreement. This suggests that the reactions to 
disagreement differ according to the tolerance that individuals have for disagreement. 
McCroskey (1992) defined tolerance for disagreement as " he amount of disagreement an 
individual can tolerate before he or she perceives th  existence of conflict in a relationship" (p. 
125). Thus, disagreement describes the mere divergence of opinions whereas conflict describes 
the interpersonal tension that can result from disagreement (Teven, McCroskey, & Richmond 
1998). This suggests that as the tolerance for disagreement fluctuates, so to does an individual’s 
tendency to engage in conversations that contain disagreement (McCroskey & Richmond, 1996; 
Teven et al., 1998). And, since tolerance for disagreement reflects a general disposition toward 
disagreement, it may help to explain how individuals react to political disagreement differently. 
Political Information Efficacy 
Recent research has further explored individual differences concerning perceptions of 
political knowledge. These differences often manifest along gender lines. Women have reported 
lower levels of political knowledge in general (Eveland & Thomson, 2006). In presidential 
campaigns, men perceived themselves as informed while omen refrained from overstating their 
political knowledge (Banwart, 2007a). These trends also emerge during political conversations 
with both men and women rating men as more knowledgeable than women discussants (Cassese 
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& Snyder, 2008). These gender differences thus suggest that perceptions of political 
knowledge may help to uncover the different reactions f individuals to political disagreement. 
Political communication research has typically measured external political efficacy, or 
perceptions of institutional responsiveness, and internal political efficacy, or an individual’s 
overall competence to participate in politics (Niem, Craig, & Mattei, 1991). However, these 
constructs do not necessarily reflect the ways in which political knowledge efficacy influences 
interpersonal interactions. For example, a recent study found that neither internal nor external 
political efficacy significantly relate to perceived disagreement (Klofstad et al., 2013). However, 
because these efficacy constructs do not capture the ways in which political knowledge 
influences efficacy and political participation, they may overlook important processes that shape 
political behavior (Kaid et al., 2007). For these reasons, it is necessary to examine individuals’ 
perceptions of political knowledge rather than inter al and external political efficacy.  
Kaid et al. (2007) proposed Political Information Efficacy (PIE) in order to focus “solely 
on the voter’s confidence in his or her own political knowledge and its sufficiency to engage the 
political process” (p. 1096). Consistent with previous political knowledge findings, studies have 
found that men tend to report higher levels of PIE than women (Banwart, 2007a; Tedesco, 2011). 
Research has also demonstrated that PIE is sensitive to political messages. Tedesco (2011) found 
that despite reported differences in PIE, both young men and young women experience similar 
gains in efficacy when exposed to online political messages (Tedesco, 2011). Moreover, PIE is 
particularly well suited for research on Facebook interactions because it reflects many of the 
concerns of young voters. Young voters tend to attribute political behaviors to their confidence 
in their political knowledge (Wells & Dudash, 2007). Young voters also acquire much of their 
political knowledge through political discussions and place considerable weight on these 
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conversations (Wells & Dudash, 2007). Given these findings, PIE may also help explain how 
individuals differ in their responses to political disagreement on Facebook. 
Political Extremism 
Finally, reactions to disagreement may vary according to levels of political extremism. 
Previous research has found that homogenous media content (Warner, 2010) and presidential 
debates (Warner & McKinney, 2013) tend to increase political extremism. Political extremism 
has also been linked to perceived disagreement and political participation. Politically extreme 
individuals who perceived high disagreement are more likely to participate in political behaviors 
than their counterparts who perceived less disagreement (Wojcieszak, 2011). The present study 
will therefore also examine the ways in which politically extreme individuals react to perceived 
disagreement. 
Conditional Indirect Effects 
This study’s final goal is to examine both how and when Facebook political disagreement 
influences Facebook political participation by analyzing the conditional indirect effects of 
political disagreement on Facebook. Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007) defined a conditional 
indirect effect as “the magnitude of an indirect effect at a particular value of a moderator (or at 
particular values of more than one moderator)” (p. 186). Thus, this study will hypothesize that 
both the direct and indirect effects of Facebook political disagreement on Facebook political 
participation will vary as functions of tolerance for disagreement, political information efficacy, 
and political extremism.  
   26
H6: The effect of perceived disagreement on Facebook p litical participation through 
avoidance will vary as a function of (a) tolerance for disagreement, (b) political 
information efficacy, and (c) political extremism.  
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Chapter Three: Methods 
Participants 
An online survey was completed by 452 undergraduate students at a major Midwestern 
university. In accordance with Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) recommendations, 11 respondents 
with missing data were removed due to item nonrespon e rates in excess of 5%. Since the 
remaining respondents had fewer than three missing items, those values were replaced by the 
mean of the corresponding scale (Graham, Cumsille, & Elek-Fisk, 2003). Finally, respondents 
who had Mahalanobis distances greater than χ2 (7) = 24.32 (p < .001) were removed 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), which yielded a final sample of 432 respondents. 
The sample consisted of 251 (58.1%) female and 181 (41.9%) male respondents with 
active Facebook accounts. The mean age of the sample was 19.50 (SD = 1.43) and the mode and 
media were both 19.00. The sample was predominantly Caucasian (83.3%) with less than 4% 
being African American (3.5%), multiracial (3.2%), Hispanic (2.8%), Asian American (1.9%), 
international students (1.6%), Native American (1.2%), and 2.5% reporting “other.” There were 
slightly more Democrats (N = 160, 37.0%) than Republicans (N = 145, 33.6%) and 127 (29.4%) 
respondents identified as Independents. 
Measures 
Covariates. Socio-economic status was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from lower 
class to upper class (M = 3.45, SD = .82). Respondents reported an average of 43.51 minutes (SD 
= 42.20) per day on Facebook and 716.81 Facebook friends (SD = 443.23). Political interest was 
measured with one item, “How interested would you say you are in politics?” Respondents 
reported on a 5-point scale ranging from very uninterested to very interested (M = 3.16, SD = 
1.05). 
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GPA Variables. Secondary goals were measured with 21-items adapte  from Dillard 
et al.’s (1989) goals scale, which contains subscale  for the influence, identity, interaction, 
relational resource, personal resource, and affect management goals. Respondents rated their 
level of agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Since 
Dillard et al. (1989) developed the scale to be flexibl  for a variety of contexts, items were 
modified to ask about political conversations on Facebook. For example, the item “It was very 
important to me to convince this person to do what I wanted him or her to do,” was changed to, 
“ It is very important to me to convince Facebook friends to consider my political views.”  
Exploratory factor analysis was performed on the 21 secondary goal items using a 
principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation. The analysis revealed the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was acceptable (.86), and Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant, χ2 = 2928.43, p < .001, indicating the appropriateness of the factor 
analysis on these data. In order to decide the number of retained factors, a parallel analysis was 
conducted using 100 replications of random data in he Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis 
computer program (Watkins, 2000). After examining several methods, Hayton, Allen, and 
Scarpello (2004) recommended the use of parallel analysis as the primary method for factor 
retention decision in exploratory factor analysis. Factors were therefore retained if the observed 
eigenvalues exceeded the random eigenvalues from the parallel analysis. The fourth and fifth 
observed eigenvalues, 1.40 and 1.01 respectively, dmonstrated the cutoff point when compared 
with the fourth and fifth random eigenvalues from the parallel analysis, 1.24 and 1.20 
respectively. An examination of the scree plot furthe  supported this decision to retain a 4-factor 
solution. As can be seen in Table 1, the final soluti n accounted for 53.83% of the variance and 
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consisted of 16 of the original 21 items that loaded with at least .60 on one factor and less than 
.40 on the remaining factors. 
The first factor, the affect management goal, accounted for 23.04% of the variance 
(eigenvalue = 4.84) and included six items. This factor was characterized by respondents’ 
concerns of having their feelings hurt if they engaged in Facebook political conversations. A 
mean index was computed by averaging the items (Cronbach’s α = .97). The second factor, the 
interaction goal, accounted for 17.00% of the variance (eigenvalue = 3.56) and included four 
items. This factor was characterized by respondents’ awareness of how Facebook friends 
perceive their behaviors during political conversations. A mean index was computed by 
averaging the items (Cronbach's α = .71). The third factor, the influence goal, accounted for 
7.64% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.60) and included three items. This factor was 
characterized by respondents’ desires to have their political views considered by their Facebook 
friends. A mean index was computed by averaging the items (Cronbach's α = .76). The fourth 
factor, the identity goal, accounted for 6.17% of the variance (eigenvalue = 1.30) and included 
three items. This factor was characterized by respondents’ personal beliefs that their own 
political views do not belong on Facebook. A mean index was computed by averaging the means 
(Cronbach's α = .84). See Table 2 for descriptive statistics for all study variables. 
***Table 1 About Here*** 
PIC variables. Cognitive engagement, perceived relevance, and perceiv d knowledge 
were measured using Banwart’s (2007b) 15-item Politica  Interpersonal Communication index. 
Items asked respondents to rate their level of agreement on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. Cognitive engagement included eight items such as, “I stay up to date 
on current political topics and issues” (Cronbach’s α = .89). Perceived relevance consisted of 
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four items, three of which were reverse coded such as, “I do not understand how politics and 
political issues relate to me” (Cronbach’s α = .70). Perceived knowledge included three items 
such as, “It is important that I obtain news about a political topic from several sources before I 
will talk about it with others” (Cronbach’s α = .71). 
Facebook participation. Facebook political participation was measured using a 13-item 
index of activities with several items adapted from Vitak et al. (2011) and Warner et al. (2012). 
Items asked respondents to report how often (0 = never, 1 = once, 2 = a few times, 3 = often) they 
had done each of the listed activities in the previous six months. Items included activities such 
as, “’Like’ a status or comment about politics,” “ Post a status or comment about politics,” and 
“Share a link about politics.”  
In order to examine the factor structure of the Facebook political participation index, 
exploratory factor analysis via principal component a alysis was conducted on the 13 items. 
Results revealed that the second factor eigenvalue of 1.12 did not exceed the eigenvalue of 1.22 
produced from a parallel analysis using Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis (Watkins, 2000) 
with 100 replications. The scree plot further confirmed the findings of the parallel analysis, thus 
the index was deemed one-dimensional. This final one-dimensional solution accounted for 
44.30% of the variance. Since the original items loaded with values greater than .40, all 13 items 
were retained (Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Perceived Disagreement. To measure perceived political disagreement on Facebook, 
respondents were asked to respond to three questions on a 7-point scale ranging from always the 
same to always different (Cronbach’s α = .84). The three items were worded as follows: “When it 
comes to political issues, do you tend to have the same or different opinions as your Facebook 
friends?” “ When it comes to political figures, do you tend to have the same or different opinions 
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as your Facebook friends?” and “During last year's election, did you tend to have th  same or 
different opinions as your Facebook friends when it came to presidential candidates Barack 
Obama and Mitt Romney?” 
Avoidance. To measure the intention to avoid political discussion on Facebook, 
respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with four items using a 7-point scale 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Cronbach’s α = .96). These items included, “I 
try to avoid discussing political issues on Facebook,” “ I try to avoid posting on threads where 
Facebook friends are discussing political issues,” “ I try to avoid discussing political figures on 
Facebook,” and “I try to avoid posting on threads where Facebook friends are discussing 
political figures.” 
Tolerance for disagreement. Tolerance for disagreement was measured using Teven t 
al.’s (1998) 15-item Revised Tolerance for Disagreem nt scale (Cronbach’s α = .85). 
Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with items such as “I enjoy disagreeing with 
others” and “I enjoy talking to people with points of view different than mine” using a 5-point 
scale ranging from strong disagree to strongly agree. 
Political information efficacy. Political efficacy was measured using Kaid et al.’s 
(2007) 4-item measurement of political information efficacy (Cronbach’s α = .86). The PIE scale 
asked respondents to rate each item using a 5-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree. 
Political extremism. Political extremism was measured by asking respondents to rate 
their attitudes toward Democrats and Republicans using a feeling thermometer with 0 meaning 
very unfavorable or cold and 100 meaning very favorble or warm. Political extremism was 
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calculated by taking the absolute value of the difference of the two values for each respondent. 
Descriptive statistics for all measures are presented in Table 2. 
***Table 2 Here*** 
Statistical Procedures 
Data analyses were conducted using SPSS. For the first set of hypotheses, regression 
analyses were conducted to examine and compare the overall PIC and GPA models as predictors 
of Facebook political participation. Regression analysis was then performed in order to assess the 
PIC variables as predictors of secondary goals. For the second set of hypotheses, analyses were 
conducted in order to examine perceived disagreement. Linear regression analysis was conducted 
to examine the relationship between perceived disagreement and Facebook political 
participation. PROCESS, a path analytic approach described by Hayes (2013), was then used to 
assess the effects of perceived disagreement both directly and indirectly through avoidance on 
political participation. PROCESS was then used to assess the direct and indirect effects as 
functions of tolerance for disagreement, political nformation efficacy, and political extremism. 
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Chapter Four: Results 
Interpersonal Constructs 
For the hypotheses that focused on the GPA and PIC variables, linear regression analyses 
were conducted to examine the overall models as predictors of Facebook political participation. 
Additional regression analyses were then conducted to xamine the PIC variables as predictors 
of GPA variables. The same control variables—socio-e nomic status, age, sex, Facebook time, 
Facebook friends, and political party—were used throughout the analyses. 
Secondary goals. Model 1 included the four secondary goals retained from the factor 
analysis: influence, identity, interaction, and affect management. As shown in Table 3, the 
overall model was significant, accounting for 21.6% of variance in predicting Facebook political 
participation. For the control variables, respondents who were older, spent more time on 
Facebook, and were Democrats reported more political activity on Facebook. Hypothesis 1 
posited that (a) individuals with strong influence goals would be more likely to participate in 
political activity on Facebook and that (b) individuals with strong identity goals would be less 
likely to participate in political activity. Only Hypothesis 1b was supported. Results indicated 
that the influence goal was not a significant predictor of Facebook political participation, while 
the identity goal was a significant, negative predictor. Research Question 1 asked about the 
interaction and affect management goals. Results reveal d that the interaction goal was a 
significant, positive predictor of Facebook political participation, while the affect management 
goal was not significant. 
PIC index. Model 2 included the three PIC variables: cognitive engagement, perceived 
knowledge, and perceived relevance. Hypothesis 2 posited that individuals with high levels of 
cognitive engagement, perceived knowledge, and perceived relevance would be more likely to 
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participate in political activity on Facebook. As shown in Table 3, the overall model was 
significant, accounting for 34.9% of variance in predicting Facebook political participation. For 
the control variables, respondents who were older, spent more time on Facebook, and were 
Democrats reported more political activity on Facebook. For the PIC variables, cognitive 
engagement and perceived relevance were significant, positive predictors of political activity on 
Facebook. However, perceived knowledge was not significa t. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was only 
partially supported. 
***Table 3 About Here*** 
Comparing Models. In order to draw further comparisons between the overall PIC and 
GPA models as predictors of Facebook political participation, regression analyses were 
performed using procedures described by Henningsen, Valde, Russell, and Russell (2011). In the 
first regression, the GPA variables were entered into the model, followed by the PIC variables. In 
the second regression, the PIC variables were entered, followed by the GPA variables. Changes 
in R2 were then compared to determine the extent to which each model accounted for the 
variance in Facebook political participation. In both regressions, the control variables produced a 
significant R2 of .095, F(7, 424) = 6.36, p < .000.  
In the first regression, the GPA variables contributed significantly to the prediction of 
political activity on Facebook with an R2 change of .121, F(4, 420) = 16.16, p < .001. In the 
following step, the PIC variables also contributed significantly with an R2 change of .178, 
F(3,417) = 40.94, p < .001. In the second regression, the PIC variables contributed significantly 
to the overall model with an R2 change of .254, F(3, 421) = 54.76, p < .001. In the following 
step, the GPA variables also contributed significantly with an R2 change of .045, F(4, 417) = 
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7.76, p < .001. These results suggest that each model significantly contributes to explaining 
unique variance in Facebook political participation not accounted for by the other model.  
***Table 4 About Here*** 
Table 4 shows standardized regression coefficients for the variables when all entered into 
the regression equation. For the control variables, respondents who were older, spent more time 
on Facebook, and were Democrats reported more political activity on Facebook. For the GPA 
variables, only one secondary goal was significant. The identity goal was a significant, negative 
predictor of political activity on Facebook while the other goals were not significant. For the PIC 
variables, cognitive engagement and perceived relevance were positive, significant predictors of 
political activity on Facebook, though perceived knowledge was not significant. 
Predicting secondary goals. In order to explore Research Question 2, which asked about 
the relationships between the PIC variables and secondary goals, regression analyses were 
performed with each of the secondary goals as criterion variables. The models, which are 
summarized in Table 5, performed well, accounting for 20.6% of variance in the influence goal, 
17.7% of the variance in the identity goal, 16.3% of the variance in the interaction goal, and 
9.0% of the variance in the affect management goal. For the control variables, Democrats and 
Republicans reported stronger influence goals. Respondents who were younger reported stronger 
identity goals. And, respondents who were female and respondents who were Republican 
reported stronger affect management goals. 
Hypotheses 3a, which posited that the influence goal w uld be positively predicted by 
cognitive engagement and perceived relevance, was partially supported. Results revealed that for 
the influence goal, all three PIC variables were significant, though only cognitive engagement 
was positive predictor. Surprisingly, perceived relevance was a negative predictor of the 
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influence goal. Hypothesis 3b, which posited that te interaction goal would be positively 
predicted by perceived knowledge, was supported. Results revealed that the interaction goal was 
positively predicted by perceived knowledge and perceived relevance. The identity goal was 
negatively predicted by cognitive engagement and positively predicted by perceived knowledge. 
Finally, the affect management goal was negatively predicted by perceived knowledge. 
***Table 5 About Here*** 
Political Disagreement Constructs 
To examine the second set of hypotheses, which proposed several relationships between 
perceived disagreement and Facebook political participation, three steps of statistical analyses 
were conducted. First, linear regression analysis wa  performed to examine the relationship 
between perceived disagreement and Facebook political participation. Next, PROCESS, a path 
analytic approach described by Hayes (2013), was used to examine the effects of perceived 
disagreement both directly and indirectly through avoidance on political participation. Finally, 
PROCESS was again utilized to examine both the direct and indirect effects as functions of 
tolerance for disagreement, political information efficacy, political extremism, and perceive 
disagreement. The same covariates—socio-economic status, age, sex, Facebook time, Facebook 
friends, political party, and political interest—were used throughout the analyses. Since a 
bootstrapping approach does not require the direct and indirect effects to be normally distributed, 
each PROCESS model used 10,000 bootstrapped bias corrected resamples. 
Disagreement. Hypothesis 4 predicted that individuals with high perceived disagreement 
would be less likely to participate in political activity on Facebook. Regression analysis revealed 
that the overall model was significant, accounting for 25.4% of the variance, F(9, 422) = 15.96, p 
< .001. For the covariates, respondents who were old r (B = .74, SE B = .21, p = .001), spent 
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more time on Facebook (B = .03, SE B = .01, p < .001), Democrats (B = 2.25, SE B = .75, p = 
.003) and were more politically interested (B = 2.59, SE B = .29, p < .001) were more likely to 
participate in political activity on Facebook. However, Hypothesis 4 was not supported as 
perceived disagreement (B = .76, SE B = .35, p = .028) positively predicted political activity on 
Facebook. 
 Indirect effects. Hypothesis 5 predicted that as perceived disagreement increased, 
individuals would increasingly try to avoid politics and, in turn, participate less often in political 
activity on Facebook. Hayes’ (2013) PROCESS macro (m del 4) was used in order to examine 
the effects of perceived disagreement both directly and indirectly through avoidance on 
Facebook political participation. 
Regression coefficients for all of the variables in the avoidance and political participation 
models are summarized in Table 6. As can be seen in paths a and b in Figure 1, perceived 
disagreement positively predicted avoidance, and avoid nce negatively predicted political 
participation. As illustrated in paths c’ and c in Figure 1, perceived disagreement had a positive 
direct effect and negative indirect effect on political participation. The 95% BC bootstrap 
confidence intervals indicated that both the direct effect (.55, 1.81) and the indirect effect (-.77, -
.10) were significant, supporting Hypothesis 5. Thus, these results revealed that avoidance not 
only mediated the relationship between perceived disagreement and political participation, 
avoidance also suppressed the relationship between disagreement and political participation. 
***Figure 1 About Here*** 
***Table 6 About Here*** 
Conditional effects. Hypothesis 6 predicted that the direct and indirect effects of 
disagreement on Facebook political participation would vary as functions of (a) tolerance for 
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disagreement, (b) political information efficacy, and (c) political extremism. In order to test 
the conditional indirect effects of perceived disagreement, each moderator was mean-centered 
and entered into PROCESS model number 8, illustrated in figure 2. Separate models were run 
for each moderator variable. Values for each of the moderators were selected in each model at 
the mean and plus or minus one standard deviation (low, moderate, and high). 
***Figure 2 About Here*** 
Tolerance for disagreement. Hypothesis 6a proposed that the direct and indirect effects 
of perceived disagreement on Facebook political participation would vary as individuals varied 
in their tolerance for disagreement. As can be seenin Table 7, although the direct relationship 
between perceived disagreement and participation remained significant, the direct effect became 
smaller as tolerance for disagreement increased. For the indirect effects, the effects of perceived 
disagreement through avoidance on participation becam  larger as tolerance for disagreement 
increased. In fact, at the low level of tolerance for disagreement, the indirect effect was not 
significant, which suggests that there is not a reltionship between perceived disagreement and 
Facebook political participation for individuals with low tolerance for disagreement. Overall, 
Hypothesis 6a was supported as these results indicate  that the effects of disagreement on 
political participation, both directly and indirectly, varied as a function of tolerance for 
disagreement. 
***Table 7 About Here*** 
Political information efficacy. Hypothesis 6b proposed that the direct and indirect 
effects of perceived disagreement on Facebook political participation would vary as individuals 
varied in their political information efficacy. The findings for political information efficacy are 
summarized in Table 8. Results revealed that the direct effect of perceived disagreement on 
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political participation became smaller as political information efficacy increased. For the 
indirect effects, the effects of perceived disagreem nt through avoidance on political 
participation also became smaller as political information efficacy increased, so much so that the 
indirect effect was not significant at the high level of political information efficacy. Hypothesis 
6b was supported as these results revealed that the effects of disagreement on political 
participation varied as a function of political information efficacy.  
***Table 8 About Here*** 
Political Extremism. Hypothesis 6c posited that the direct and indirect effects of 
perceived disagreement would vary as individuals varied in political extremism. As can be seen 
in Table 9, results revealed that the direct effect of perceived disagreement became smaller as 
political extremism increased. For the indirect effects, the effects of perceived disagreement 
through avoidance also became smaller as political extremism increased. Much like the political 
information efficacy findings, the indirect effect was not significant at the high level of political 
extremism. Hypothesis 6c was supported as the results revealed that the effect of disagreement 
on political participation varied as a function of political extremism. 
***Table 9 About Here*** 
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
This study sought to compare two interpersonal constructs and to examine the effects of 
political disagreement in order to examine why and how Facebook political participation occurs. 
First, through the Goals-Plans-Action model and the Political Interpersonal Communication 
index, this study analyzed the cognitive influences that shape and constrain political activity on 
Facebook. Second, this study analyzed the ways in wh ch exposure to political disagreement 
relates to Facebook political participation. Ultimately, the results revealed many of the forces 
that motivate, constrain, and shape Facebook political discussion. 
Goals-Plans-Action and Political Interpersonal Communication 
 In terms of the GPA model, the interaction and identity goals contributed significantly to 
explaining variance in Facebook political participat on. Individuals were motivated to participate 
in Facebook political activity due to strong interaction goals. Surprisingly, however, the 
influence goal did not predict Facebook political prticipation. These results suggest that while 
individuals might want to persuade their Facebook friends about certain political topics, they 
ultimately decide to engage in political conversations when they feel that their behaviors would 
create or maintain positive impressions. This is consistent with Rosenberg and Egbert’s (2001) 
study that found Facebook behaviors tended to reflect relational and interaction goals and 
impression management strategies more than instrumental desires. This finding also appears to 
reflect Dillard et al.'s (1989) contention that theinfluence goal primarily reflects energy and 
effort in an influence process while the secondary goals reflect communication. This may also 
explain the prevalence of the interaction goal in Facebook political conversations. As Berger 
(1997) argues, "people who wish to achieve the goalof changing the opinion of another may feel 
it necessary to ingratiate themselves in their targets first" (p.21). Given these findings, future 
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research should further examine the relationships between secondary goals and efficiency in 
message production (Berger, 1997; Kellermann, 2004) in the context of online political 
discussions.  
On the whole, however, these results indicated that individuals rarely engaged in 
Facebook political activity due to, in large part, the identity goal. This suggests that individuals 
tend to refrain from political activity because they view political conversations on Facebook as 
inappropriate. The prevalence of the identity goal and its relationship with Facebook political 
participation might be explained by research that suggests a relationship between political 
socialization and political discussion frequency (Hutchens & Eveland, 2009). In other words, 
individuals may formulate these personal standards of political discussion through early social 
experiences. 
Several inferences may also be drawn concerning secondary goals from the exploratory 
factor analysis. Although this study adapted items from Dillard et al.’s (1989) scale that includes 
six secondary goals, the exploratory factor analysis retained only four factors. Items from the 
first omitted goal, the personal resource goal, appe red to collapse into one factor with affect 
management items. Though unexpected, this result makes sense in an online context because, 
unlike face-to-face interactions, the personal resources at stake on Facebook are not physical in 
nature. Instead, because individuals worry about gettin  their feelings hurt, they attempt to 
manage interactions in order to avoid discomfort or anxiety. The second omitted goal, the 
relational resource goal, included three items adapted from Dillard et al.’s (1989) secondary goal 
scale. One of these items loaded onto the influence goal loaded onto the influence goal, another 
item loaded onto the interaction goal, and the final item was excluded from the analysis. Thus, 
although the influence and interaction goals contained some relational elements, none of the 
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retained factors appeared to reflect the relational resource goal. These results suggest a need 
for future research to re-conceptualize what counts as a relational “resource” in online contexts 
such as Facebook. Rather than worrying about offline relationships, for example, Facebook users 
might be more concerned about online resources such as “likes,” “comments,” or 
“subscriptions.” 
Factor analysis also revealed that the affect management goal only reflected negative 
affect characteristics. However, since individuals are not physically present in Facebook 
interactions, individuals likely feel less exposed and, consequently, less likely to experience 
discomfort or nervousness while engaging in political discussion on Facebook. This does not 
suggest, however, that individuals do not experience comfort or excitement as they anticipate or 
engage political conversations. Instead, previous research suggests that individuals do, in fact, 
feel comfortable and express their opinions when thy believe that others will support them 
(Dalisay, Hmielowski, Kushin, & Yamamoto, 2012). Furthermore, individuals may also choose 
to engage in political conversations on Facebook when t ey anticipate a thrilling or exciting 
conversation experience. 
Analysis of the Political Interpersonal Communication ndex provides some insights in 
the area of positive affect. In particular, the cognitive engagement dimension, which was found 
to be the largest predictor of Facebook political participation, captures an affective cognitive 
dimension that reflects an individual’s fascination with politics (Banwart, 2007b). Surprisingly, 
however, while perceived relevance also predicted Facebook political participation, perceived 
knowledge was not significant. These findings suggest that while individuals who are fascinated 
and who feel personally affected by politics are more likely to engage in political activity on 
Facebook, individuals are generally not concerned about feeling sufficiently knowledgeable 
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about politics. In other words, these findings suggest that individuals do not hold themselves 
accountable in terms of political knowledge during political conversations on Facebook.  
On the whole, assessments of both the GPA and the PIC variables highlight the 
importance of giving careful consideration to the ways in which interpersonal communication 
occurs in online contexts. Analysis of the dimensio in both the GPA model and the PIC index 
further suggest that scholars should not hesitate to adapt face-to-face concepts and constructs in 
order to more accurately reflect the unique characte istics of online political discussion. 
Comparing the GPA model and the PIC index 
Additional analyses were also performed in order to draw more direct comparisons 
between the GPA and PIC models. The models were first compared in terms of their unique 
contributions in accounting for the variance of Facebook political participation. Next, the GPA 
and PIC variables were all entered into a regression equation predicting Facebook political 
participation.  
In terms of the overall models, results revealed that both the PIC index and the GPA 
models accounted for additional, unique variance in political participation. However, the PIC 
index appeared to be the superior model. When entered first, the PIC variables accounted for 
more than five times the amount of variance accounted for by the secondary goals. Even when 
were entered after the secondary goals, the PIC variables accounted for more of the variance in 
Facebook political participation. And, with all of the variables entered in the regression equation, 
both cognitive engagement and perceived relevance wer significant predictors of Facebook 
political discussion while only one secondary goal, the identity goal, was significant. These 
findings revealed that cognitive engagement was the ingle largest predictor and again illustrated 
that the instrumental goal did not bear a significant relationship with Facebook political 
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participation. These results suggest that political a tivity on Facebook tends to reflect political 
fascinations and not desires to affect individuals’ political views. In terms of political messaging 
more broadly, this suggests that political trends come and go on Facebook because they intrigue 
individuals and not necessarily because individuals desire real changes in political beliefs. 
Finally, these findings also suggest that cognitive engagement and perceived relevance likely 
trumped the interaction goal, which was found to be a significant predictor without the PIC 
variables entered.  
Finally, regression analyses were conducted with the PIC variables entered as predictors 
for each secondary goal. It was hypothesized that individuals with high cognitive engagement 
and individuals with high perceived relevance would have stronger influence goals. However, 
while all three PIC variables were found to be signif cant, only cognitive engagement was a 
positive predictor of the influence goal. Surprisingly, individuals with high perceived relevance 
also reported weaker influence goals. This suggests tha  individuals who believe politics directly 
influences their lives do not tend to believe that F cebook is a place where they can actually 
affect political change. Results did support the hypothesized relationship for individuals with 
high cognitive engagement and strong influence goals, which makes sense because individuals 
who enjoy thinking about politics would also likely want to have their political views considered 
by friends. Results also revealed that individuals with high perceived knowledge were less likely 
to have stronger influence goals. While not expected, i  makes sense that individuals would not 
seek out Facebook political conversations in order to persuade their friends about political issues 
when they are already concerned about the sufficiency of their own political knowledge. 
It was also hypothesized that individuals with high perceived knowledge would also 
report stronger interaction goals. Results supported this hypothesis, which suggests that 
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individuals who are more concerned about having sufficient knowledge before entering 
political conversations are also more concerned with creating and maintain positive impressions 
during political conversations on Facebook. Results also revealed that individuals with high 
perceived relevance reported stronger interaction goals, which suggests that individuals who 
believe politics directly influences their lives also tend to be concerned with how they are 
perceived during political conversations on Facebook. 
Analyses also examined how the PIC variables related to the identity and affect 
management goals. Results for the identity goal revealed that individuals with low cognitive 
engagement and high perceived knowledge reported stronger identity goals. It makes sense that 
individuals do not think their political views belong on Facebook when they dislike politics or 
when they are concerned about possessing enough political knowledge. For the affect 
management goal, individuals with high perceived knowledge also reported stronger affect 
management goals. 
These analyses of PIC variables and secondary goalsalso raise some interesting question 
regarding perceived knowledge and Facebook political participation. Even though perceived 
knowledge was significantly related to the interaction and identity goals, earlier analysis revealed 
that perceived knowledge did not predict Facebook political participation while the interaction 
and identity goals did. Even more interesting, the standardized regression coefficients presented 
in Table 3 also indicate that the relationships with perceived knowledge and the identity and 
interaction goals were two of the largest relationship  among all of the PIC and GPA variables. 
Thus, while perceived knowledge may not offer a direct explanation of communicative behavior 
in online political discussions, these results suggest that perceived knowledge does offer an 
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explanation of the interpersonal process that directly contribute to online political discussion 
behaviors. 
Overall, these results illustrate the potential for unique contributions from the intersection 
of both interpersonal and political communication scholarship when seeking to further study and 
more deeply understand the complexities surrounding political discussion research. Based on 
these findings future research should continue exploring this overlap by examining the function 
of secondary goals in various political discussion models such as Eveland’s (2004) discussion 
elaboration model or by examining the differences btween online and offline political 
discussions. The application of interpersonal constructs in these areas should help to uncover the 
relational influences that political communication scholars might otherwise overlook. Regardless 
of the direction, however, research at the intersection of political and interpersonal 
communication should strive to reflect the rich literature bases in each of these areas. 
Political Disagreement 
In terms of political disagreement, the initial analysis contradicted the hypothesized 
relationship between perceived disagreement and Facebook political discussion. Although 
previous research suggested that individuals would be more likely to retreat from political 
activity when they encountered more disagreement on Facebook, results revealed that individuals 
with high perceived disagreement actually reported more Facebook political participation. While 
previous research has regularly produced conflicting fi dings concerning disagreement and 
political participation (Klofstad, 2013; Nir, 2005), this result might reflect the nature of political 
communication on a socially oriented site such as Facebook. It could be, for instance, that 
individuals are more open to disagreement in socially oriented sites for the same reasons that 
they experience more political disagreement on sites that are not politically oriented (Wojcieszak 
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& Mutz, 2009). Individuals may therefore feel more relaxed in these settings, and 
consequently, more likely to chime in when they encounter interesting political disagreements. 
While Facebook’s social orientation is one possible explanation, another explanation may 
be that there is more to the relationship between perceived disagreement and political 
participation. To examine a more nuanced relationship, t is study also examined the direct and 
indirect effects of perceived disagreement after accounting for the intention to avoid politics on 
Facebook. Results supported the hypothesis that perceiv d disagreement would effect Facebook 
political participation through avoidance. Results revealed that perceived disagreement had a 
positive direct effect and a negative indirect effect on Facebook political activity. Interestingly, 
avoidance thus functioned as both a mediator and a suppressor variable in the relationship 
between perceived disagreement and Facebook political participation. Unlike the findings 
presented for Hypothesis 5, which revealed a positive relationship between disagreement and 
political participation, the indirect effect appears consistent with Mutz's (2002b) argument that 
individuals retreat from political activity as they perceive more disagreement. The direct effect 
also suggests that when individuals actively decide not to retreat from political conversations 
they become more likely to enter into political conversations as perceived disagreement 
increases. In other words, Facebook users who perceiv  more disagreement also tend to avoid 
political conversations and, in turn, participate less often in Facebook political activity. The 
decision to avoid political topics on Facebook therefo e suppresses the overall relationship 
between perceived disagreement and Facebook political participation.  
Overall, these findings suggest a more complicated relationship between disagreement 
and participation than is commonly described in political discussion literature. Rather than 
attempting to resolve the debate about whether or not exposure to political disagreement 
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increases or decreases political participation, these findings suggest that researchers should 
expect and examine a more nuanced relationship. This suggestion is consistent with Klofstad’s 
(2013) argument that contradictory findings in political disagreement literature are, in part, the 
result of measuring different manifestations of disagreement. The results presented here provide 
further explanation for this argument insofar as they reveal the possibility that individuals react 
to disagreement by altering their intentions to engage in political behaviors, which in turn 
produces lower levels of political participation. This also echoes Eveland and Morey's (2012) 
contention that researchers should consider disagreement measurements that target expressed or 
avoided disagreement rather than affiliative differences. And, as this study suggests, this 
consideration appears particularly important in online contexts where users may not be as aware 
of acquaintances’ political affiliations. However, it should be noted, as this study demonstrates, 
that avoidance is distinct from both disagreement and political discussion. 
These findings also bring into the fold questions concerning the potential spillover of 
online discussion into offline forms of political participation. Although Facebook political 
participation has been linked to voter mobilization (Bond et al., 2012) recent research has found 
little evidence that online political participation spurred broader forms of offline political 
participation (Vissers & Stolle, 2012). Given the pr sent study’s findings, however, future 
research should examine the relationships between prceived disagreement in online political 
discussions and offline political participation in order to further evaluate the ways in which 
disagreement influences political behaviors. 
 Finally, this study analyzed the direct and indirect ffects of disagreement on political 
participation by examining three moderator variables: political information efficacy, political 
extremism, and tolerance for disagreement. A path-analytic approach was conducted in order to 
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assess the direct and indirect effects at the low, medium, and high levels of each of the 
moderators. For each of the first two moderators, re ults revealed that as political information 
efficacy and political extremism increased, the effects of perceived disagreement on Facebook 
political participation decreased. These findings make sense given that political information 
efficacy (Warner, et al. 2012) and political extremis  (Wojcieszak, 2011) have been linked to 
higher levels of political participation. This is also consistent with Banwart’s (2007b) argument 
that when individuals feel more confident with their political knowledge those perceptions 
become a buffer that shields them from interpersonal risk. 
Similar results were found for the direct effects in terms of tolerance for disagreement. 
Results revealed that individuals with high tolerance for disagreement were less likely to be 
directly influenced and, surprisingly, more likely to be indirectly influenced by perceived 
disagreement. These results therefore suggest a seemingly counter-intuitive indirect relationship 
for individuals with high tolerance for disagreement. As one might expect, the direct effect 
suggests that individuals with high tolerance for disagreement are less affected by perceived 
disagreement. This finding is consistent with research that found disagreement had less of an 
effect on self-censorship for individuals with low willingness to self-censor (Hayes, Glynn, & 
Shanahan, 2005; Hayes, Uldall, & Glynn, 2010). However, contrary to what one might assume, 
the indirect effect suggests that individuals with high tolerance for disagreement are more 
affected by perceived disagreement through the intention to avoid politics on Facebook. 
Ultimately, this finding might appear counter-intuitive due to the operationalization of the 
avoidance variable. Since the variable only measures th  degree to which an individual tries to 
avoid political conversations, it does not capture those individuals who actively try to engage 
political conversations. If the intention to engage politics on Facebook had been measured, the 
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indirect effect of disagreement through engagement ay have also increased for individuals 
with high tolerance for disagreement. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that when some 
individuals with high tolerance for disagreement deci  to avoid political conversations on 
Facebook, they also tend to follow through more resolutely and consequently participate less 
often in Facebook political activity. These findings are also suggestive of a more limited contour 
than one might expect for the tolerance for disagreement construct. That is, while it makes sense 
that individuals with high tolerance for disagreement are predisposed against avoidance, these 
findings suggest that these individuals are also more likely to follow through when they do make 
avoidance decisions, even if they tend to make fewer of them. 
Limitations 
 It should be noted that the present study faced some limitations. First, the sample of 
university undergraduate students limits the generalizability of the findings. This is especially 
true in the case of young voters who tend to be less politically engaged than other segments of 
the population. On the other hand, because young voters lag behind, and because research has 
often overlooked the motivations and constraints of young voters, there is a need for research in 
this area (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). As young voters continue to encounter political 
conversations on SNSs like Facebook, research in this area will be fruitful in terms of political 
messaging and generating democratic participation. 
 Second, the present study was limited by its cross-sectional design. Although several 
models assumed causal relationships between variables, cross-sectional data prevents any real 
claims of causality, especially given a reliance on self-reports. However, while it must be 
acknowledged that these findings could be explained by reciprocal causation, numerous studies 
have nevertheless supported the causal directions claimed in the current study. Panel data has 
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consistently found that political disagreement influences political discussion (Quintelier, 
Stolle, & Harell, 2012; Wojcieszak & Price, 2012). Experimental data indicated that people tend 
to avoid interpersonal disagreement (Gerber et al., 2012). Furthermore, the hypotheses were also 
derived with theoretical support from interpersonal i fluence research (Dillard et al., 1989) and 
political information efficacy research (Kaid et al., 2007). Thus, while there is a need for future 
research to further explore these causal relationshps, the findings presented here still offer 
suggestive evidence of the motivations and constraints of online political discussion. 
 Third, the present study employed one of a variety of approaches to measuring political 
discussion. In particular, many studies in the litera ure measure political discussion variables 
with name generators that allow participants to provide more detailed descriptions of three to 
five discussants. Of course, most of this research has also assumed political discussion occurs in 
face-to-face contexts. In online contexts, however, these approaches may not capture the brevity 
of online audiences and, consequently, underrepresent online discussion networks. For these 
reasons, general discussion network measures were chos n. Future research should examine 
these measurement differences in online contexts. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This purpose of this study was to contribute to understandings of how and why political 
conversations occur on Facebook. The results presented here revealed that Facebook political 
conversations are primarily motivated by cognitive engagement and are primarily constrained by 
personal standards regarding the appropriateness of di cussing politics on Facebook. These 
conversations are further shaped by various individual reactions to disagreeable political views 
within Facebook networks. Results revealed that while perceived disagreement effects Facebook 
political participation after accounting for avoidance decisions, individuals also differ in their 
reactions to disagreement and in their decisions to avoid political discussion.  
This study provides a number of important contributions to political discussion research. 
First, it further explains the problems associated with envisaging Facebook as a potential site for 
meaningful democratic discussion. Findings suggest that Facebook does provide an outlet for 
political discussion to individuals fascinated with politics, though individuals do not approach 
these conversations to accomplish persuasive goals. Second, this study highlights the importance 
of drawing from interpersonal communication research in the area of political discussion. As 
demonstrated by the findings from the GPA model and the PIC index, interpersonal theories 
offer unique explanations for how and why political discussion occurs. Political communication 
scholars interested in examining the effects of politica  discussion would therefore do well to 
consider the interpersonal principles that inform the behaviors on which their research centers. 
Finally, this study’s findings call into question scholarly attempts to resolve the debates about the 
definition and the effects of political disagreement. I stead, political communication scholars 
should adopt a more nuanced understanding of political discussion and accept that political 
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disagreement encompasses many things that vary with contexts, research questions, and 
individuals.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Factor Loadings for Final 4-Factor Solution of Secondary Goals 
  1  2  3  4 
Facebook friends might embarrass me if I try too hard to get them 
to consider my political views. 
.73 .08 .26 .06 
I am worried that posting my political views on Facebook would 
make me uncomfortable or nervous. 
.67 .18 .12 .20 
I am worried about getting my feelings hurt if I express my 
political views on Facebook. 
.65 -.01 .38 .02 
I don’t want to look stupid while trying to persuade Facebook 
friends about political issues. 
.62 .28 -.11 -.12 
Facebook friends might insult or attack me if I keep bothering 
them with my political views. 
.61 .23 .06 -.03 
When politics comes up in Facebook conversations, I avoid saying 
things which might make me uncomfortable or nervous. 
.60 .27 -.16 .23 
I am very conscious of what is appropriate and inappropriate 
when politics comes up in Facebook conversations. 
.16 .67 -.18 .14 
I am not willing to risk possible damage to relationships in order 
to get Facebook friends to consider my political views. 
-.02 .67 -.10 .12 
When politics comes up in Facebook conversations, I am careful 
to avoid posting things which are socially inappropriate. 
.30 .62 -.23 .07 
I am concerned with putting myself in a “bad light” when I think 
about posting on Facebook about politics. 
.29 .60 .11 .14 
It is very important to me to convince Facebook friends to 
consider my political views. 
.09 -.09 .77 -.28 
I am very concerned about getting my political views considered 
when I am on Facebook. 
.10 .04 .77 -.13 
Getting Facebook friends to consider my political views is more 
important to me than preserving relationships. 
-.10 .26 .71 .16 
I believe that my political views don’t belong on Facebook. .08 .07 -.17 .86 
I believe that I should keep my political views to myself when I’m 
on Facebook. 
.09 .16 -.14 .84 
Facebook is not an appropriate place for me to persuade people 
about politics. 
.07 .16 -.27 .76 
Eigenvalue 4.84 3.56 1.60 1.30 
Variance Explained (%) 23.04 17.00 7.64 6.17 
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Table 2 
Descriptive and Reliability Statistics of Study Variables (N = 432) 
 M SD Cronbach’s α 
GPA variables    
   Influence goal 1.98 .78 .759 
   Identity goal 3.65 .90 .836 
   Interaction goal 3.50 .76 .707 
   Affect management goal 2.95 .71 .779 
PIC variables    
   Cognitive Engagement 3.11 .78 .892 
   Perceived Relevance 3.69 .69 .705 
   Perceived Knowledge 3.99 .73 .714 
Facebook participation 7.71 7.00 .892 
Disagreement 3.87 .85 .841 
Avoidance 5.49 1.52 .955 
Tolerance for disagreement 3.06 .56 .852 
Political information efficacy 2.96 .87 .857 
Political extremism 38.49 28.12  
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Table 3 
Regression Models of GPA and PIC Predicting Facebook P litical Participation (N = 432) 
  Model 1   Model 2  
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Controls       
   Age .60 .22 .12*** .56 .20 .12** 
   Sex (high: female) -.87 .65 -.06 -.17 .59 -.01 
   Socio-economic status .22 .40 .03 .10 .36 .01 
   Facebook time .03 .01 .17** .03 .01 .18*** 
   Facebook friends .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .03 
   Democrat 2.16 .77 .15*** 1.94 .69 .13** 
   Republican .95 .82 .06 1.07 .73 .07 
PIC variables       
   Cognitive engagement    3.89 .42 .44*** 
   Perceived knowledge    -.57 .41 -.06 
   Perceived relevance    1.54 .49 .15** 
Secondary goals       
   Influence .42 .87 .05    
   Identity -2.54 .39 -.33***    
   Interaction 2.38 .48 .26***    
   Affect management -.60 .52 -.06    
R
2
 change  .121***   .254***  
Total R
2
  .216***   .349***  
*p < .050 **p < .010 ***p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Regression Coefficients for GPA and PIC Variables in a Combined Analysis (N = 432) 
 B SE B β 
Controls    
   Age .45 .20 .09* 
   Sex (high: female) -.27 .58 -.02 
   Socio-economic status .22 .36 .02 
   Facebook time .03 .01 .19*** 
   Facebook friends .00 .00 .04 
   Democrat 1.55 .68 .11* 
   Republican .66 .72 .04 
GPA variables    
   Influence .22 .44 .02 
   Identity -1.81 .36 -.23*** 
   Interaction .75 .45 .08 
   Affect management .16 .46 .02 
PIC variables    
   Cognitive engagement 3.20 .44 .46*** 
   Perceived relevance 1.67 .49 .16** 
   Perceived knowledge -.02 .43 .00 
R
2
 change  .299***  
Total R
2
  .394***  
*p < .050 **p < .010 ***p < .001. 
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Table 5 
Regression Models Predicting Secondary Goals (N = 432) 
 Influence Identity Interaction Affect 
Management 
Control variables     
   Age .07 -.11* -.04 -.09 
   Sex (high: female) -.03 .00 .07 .16** 
   Socio-economic status -.06 .07 .04 .01 
   Facebook time .00 .05 .06 .04 
   Facebook friends .04 .02 -.06 -.08 
   Democrat .14** -.07 .06 .10 
   Republican .18** -.06 .09 .18** 
PIC variables     
   Cognitive engagement .31*** -.27*** .07 -.03 
   Perceived knowledge -.23*** .33*** .29*** .17** 
   Perceived relevance -.30*** .06 .13* -.06 
R
2
 change .150*** .144*** .142*** .026** 
Total R
2
 .206*** .177*** .163*** .090*** 
Note. Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients. 
*p < .05 **p < .010 ***p < .001. 
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Table 6 
Unstandardized Regression Coefficients (N = 432) 
 Avoidance Political Participation 
Age -.07(.05) .60(.19)** 
Sex (high: female) .30(.15)* -.25(.56) 
Socio-economic status -.05(.09) .06(.35) 
Facebook time .00(.00) .03(.01)*** 
Facebook friends .00(.00) .00(.00) 
Democrat -.32(.18) 1.69(.68)* 
Republican -.08(.19) 1.24(.72) 
Political interest -.34(.07)*** 2.00(.27)*** 
Disagreement .24(.08)** 1.18(.32)*** 
Avoidance  -1.74(.19)*** 
Total R
2
 .110*** .380*** 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < .05 **p < .010 ***p < .001. 
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Table 7 
Direct and Indirect Effects at Values of Tolerance for Disagreement (N = 432) 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
 Estimate  Confidence interval Estimate  Confidence interval 
Low (2.50) 1.26(.48) .31 to 2.22 -.29(.21) -.72 to .10 
Moderate (3.06) 1.16(.33) .50 to 1.82 -.46(.16) -.82 to -.17 
High (3.62) 1.05(.39) .28 to 1.82 -.64(.21) -1.11 to -.26 
Notes: Effect estimates are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 8 
Direct and Indirect Effects at Values of Political Information Efficacy (N = 432) 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
 Estimate  Confidence interval Estimate  Confidence interval 
Low (2.09) 1.35(.49) .40 to 2.32 -.57(.28) -1.28 to -.18 
Moderate (2.96) 1.12(.32) .49 to 1.75 -.46(.17) -.82 to -.14 
High (3.83) .88(.38) .14 to 1.62 -.26(.20) -.67 to .11 
Notes: Effect estimates are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 9 
Direct and Indirect Effects at Values of Political Extremism (N = 432) 
 Direct effects Indirect effects 
 Estimate  Confidence interval Estimate  Confidence interval 
Low (10.36) 1.73(.46) .83 to 2.63 -.66(.24) -1.21 to -.25 
Moderate (38.49) 1.32(.32) .70 to 1.95 -.41(.16) -.76 to -.12 
High (66.61) .91(.40) .13 to 1.70 -.17(.22) -.60 to .27 
Notes: Effect estimates are unstandardized; Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Figure 1 
Direct and Indirect Effects of Perceived Disagreement. 
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Figure 2 
PROCESS Model Number 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Hypothesized conditional process model; moderator variables include tolerance for disagreement, 
political information efficacy, and political extremism. 
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Appendix B: Information Statement 
 
Information Statement 
 
The Department of Communication Studies at the Univers ty of Kansas supports the practice of protection 
for human subjects participating in research. The following information is provided for you to decide 
whether you wish to participate in the present study. You should be aware that even if you agree to 
participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without penalty. 
 
We are conducting this study to better understand political communication on Facebook. This will entail 
your completion of a survey. Your participation is expected to take approximately 20-30 minutes to 
complete. The content of the survey should cause no more discomfort than you would experience in your 
everyday life.  
 
Although participation may not benefit you directly, we believe that the information obtained from this 
study will help us gain a better understanding of political discussion and engagement. Your participation 
is solicited, although strictly voluntary. Your name will not be associated in any way with the research 
findings. Your identifiable information will not be shared unless (a) it is required by law or university 
policy, or (b) you give written permission. It is possible, however, with internet communications, that 
through intent or accident someone other than the intended recipient may see your response. 
 
If you would like additional information concerning this study before or after it is completed, please feel 
free to contact us by phone or mail. 
 
Completion of the survey indicates your willingness to take part in this study and that you are at least 18 
years old. If you have any additional questions about y ur rights as a research participant, you may call 
(785) 864-7429 or write the Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of 
Kansas, 2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7563, email irb@ku.edu. 
  
 
Sincerely, 
 
Michael W. Kearney        Mary C. Banwart, Ph.D. 
Principal Investigator                           Faculty Supervisor 
Department of Communication Studies          Department of Communication Studies 
Bailey Hall                                    Bailey Hall 
University of Kansas           University of Kansas 
Lawrence, KS 66045                         Lawrence, KS 66045 
(785) 864-9893                                    (785) 864-5681 
mkearney@ku.edu            mbanwart@ku.edu 
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Appendix C: Demographics & Background 
Demographics 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your sex? 
3. What is your race/ethnicity? 
4. Of which socio-economic class do you consider yourself a member? 
5. Highest level of education to date:  
 
Facebook Use 
6. Do you have a Facebook account? 
7. On average, approximately how many minutes per day do ou spend on Facebook? 
8. Approximately how many friends do you have on Facebook? 
 
Background Political Information 
9. In politics, as of today, how would you best describe your political affiliation? 
10. How interested would you say you are in politics? 
11. How much do you tend to like or dislike each of the following groups? Please indicate your 
feeling on a scale from 0-100 where 0 means you very much dislike the group and 100 means you 
very much like the group. 
A. Democrats 
B. Republicans 
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Appendix D: Tolerance for Disagreement Scale 
Revised Tolerance for Disagreement Scale (T ven et al., 1998) (1-5 scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 5 
= strongly agree) 
1. It is more fun to be involved in a discussion where th re is a lot of disagreement. 
2. I enjoy talking to people with points of view different than mine. 
3. I don't like to be in situations where people are in disagreement.* 
4. I prefer being in groups where everyone's beliefs are the same as mine.* 
5. Disagreements are generally helpful. 
6. I prefer to change the topic of discussion when disagreement occurs.* 
7. I tend to create disagreements in conversations becaus  it serves a useful purpose. 
8. I enjoy arguing with other people about things on which we disagree. 
9. I would prefer to work independently rather than to work with other people and have 
disagreements.* 
10. I would prefer joining a group where no disagreements occur.* 
11. I don't like to disagree with other people.* 
12. Given a choice, I would leave a conversation rather t an continue a disagreement.* 
13. I avoid talking with people who I think will disagree with me.* 
14. I enjoy disagreeing with others. 
15. Disagreement stimulates a conversation and causes me to communicate more. 
*recoded 
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Appendix E: Political Information Efficacy Scale 
Political Information Efficacy Scale (Kaid et al., 2007) (1-5 scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = 
strongly agree) 
1. I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics. 
2. I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.  
3. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. 
4. If a friend asked me about the presidential election, I feel I would have enough information to 
help my friend figure out who to vote for.  
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Appendix F: Political Interpersonal Communication Index 
Political Interpersonal Communication Index (Banwart, 2007b) (1-5 scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 
5 = strongly agree) 
 Cognitive Engagement Subscale 
1. I stay up to date on current political topics and issues. 
2. I have developed opinions on political issues and topics. 
3. I am comfortable starting a discussion about political ssues with my friends. 
4. I know enough information about politics and political issues to talk about them with people I 
don’t know very well. 
5. I enjoy talking about political issues and topics with others who don’t think like me. 
6. I have a good understanding about politics and political issues. 
7. I am interested in politics and political issues. 
8. I am likely to take an equal share in the conversation when discussing politics and political issues. 
Perceived Relevance Subscale 
9. I do not understand how politics and political issue  relate to me.* 
10. Politics and political issues are just about conflict and disagreement.*  
11. Politics and political issues have a direct influenc  in my life. 
12. Politics and political issues just don’t impact me.* 
Perceived Knowledge Subscale 
13. Before participating in a conversation about politics I should be knowledgeable about the issue. 
14. I would not discuss political affairs with someone unless I knew something about the issue. 
15. It is important that I obtain news about a political topic from several sources before I will talk 
about it with others. 
*Recoded 
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Appendix G: Secondary Goals and Effort Scales 
Secondary Goals Scale (Dillard et al., 1989) and Effort Scale (1-5 scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 5 
= strongly agree) 
Influence Goal Subscale 
1. It is very important to me to convince Facebook friends to consider my political views. 
2. I am very concerned about getting my political views considered when I am on Facebook. 
3. I really don’t care that much whether Facebook friends consider my political views.* 
4. Although I want Facebook friends to consider my political views, it really isn’t that important an 
issue.* 
Identity Goal Subscale 
5. I believe that my political views don’t belong on Facebook. 
6. I believe that I should keep my political views to myself when I’m on Facebook. 
7. Facebook is not an appropriate place for me to persuade people about politics. 
Interaction Goal Subscale 
8. When I think about posting on Facebook about politics, I am concerned with making (or 
maintaining) a good impression. 
9. When politics comes up in Facebook conversations, I am careful to avoid posting things which 
are socially inappropriate. 
10. I am very conscious of what is appropriate and inappro riate when politics comes up in Facebook 
conversations. 
11. I am concerned with putting myself in a “bad light” when I think about posting on Facebook 
about politics. 
12. I don’t want to look stupid while trying to persuade Facebook friends about political issues. 
Relational Resource Goal Subscale 
13. I am not willing to risk possible damage to relationships in order to get Facebook friends to 
consider my political views. 
14. Getting Facebook friends to consider my political views is more important to me than preserving 
relationships.* 
15. I don’t really care if posting my political views would make my Facebook friends mad or not.* 
Personal Resource Goal Subscale 
16. Facebook friends might insult or attack me if I keep bothering them with my political views. 
17. Facebook friends might embarrass me if I try too hard to get them to consider my political views. 
18. I am worried about getting my feelings hurt if I express my political views on Facebook. 
Affect Management Goal Subscale 
19. When politics comes up in Facebook conversations, I avoid saying things which might make me 
uncomfortable or nervous. 
20. Discussing politics on Facebook does not seem to behe type of situation to make me 
uncomfortable or nervous.* 
21. I am worried that posting my political views on Facebook would make me uncomfortable or 
nervous. 
Effort 
22. I put a lot of thought into figuring out the best way to get some Facebook friends to consider my 
political views. 
23. I try everything I can think of to get some Facebook friends to consider my political views. 
24. I put a great deal of effort into getting some Facebook friends to consider my political views. 
*recoded 
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Appendix H: Facebook Political Participation Index 
Please indicate how often you have done each of the following activities on Facebook in the past 6 
months: (0 = never, 1 = once, 2 = a few times, and 3 = often) 
1. “Like” a friend’s status, comment, or link about politics 
2. Post a status or comment about politics 
3. Share a link about politics 
4. Reply to a status, link, or comment about politics 
5. Post an image relating to politics 
6. Comment on an image relating to politics 
7. Join or leave a group or page about politics 
8. RSVP for an event about politics 
9. Follow or like a political group or candidate 
10. Message or chat a friend about politics 
11. Add or delete political information from my profile 
12. Post or reply to a note about politics 
13. Use a hashtag about politics 
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Appendix I: Disagreement Scale 
1. When it comes to political issues, do you tend to have the same or different opinions as your 
Facebook friends? 
2. When it comes to political figures, do you tend to have the same or different opinions as your 
Facebook friends? 
3. During last year's election, did you tend to have the same or different opinions as your Facebook 
friends when it came to presidential candidates Barack Obama and Mitt Romney? 
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Appendix J: Avoidance Scale 
1. I try to avoid discussing political issues on Facebook. 
2. I try to avoid posting on threads where Facebook friends are discussing political issues. 
3. I try to avoid discussing political figures on Facebook. 
4. I try to avoid posting on threads where Facebook friends are discussing political figures. 
